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Organized Labour 
and the Impérial Munitions Board 
D.J. Bercuson 
The author examines the fight for fair wage clauses in 
Canadian munitions production at the beginning of this century. 
In 1918 and 1919 Canada experienced some of the most widespread, 
lengthy and disruptive industrial disputes of the century. A variety of 
factors, social, political and économie, created a mood of frustration and 
anger within the ranks of working men and women which swept along in 
an ever widening torrent of social protest and finally burst upon the 
national scène in a séries of speotacular strikes beginning in the spring and 
summer of 1918. Though conscription, restrictive orders-in-couneil and the 
high cost of living are usually cited as prominent causes in the build-up of 
industrial tensions, the frustrated ambitions of trade union leaders must 
also be included in any list of explanations. Organized labour in Canada 
looked to the opportunities presented by war to build not only membership 
rolls, but demonstrable public esteem and social and industrial leverage. 
When union leaders were denied the fulfillment of thèse désires by a 
government agency which held sway over tens of thousands of war workers 
but whose labour policies basically reflected the attitudes of one manr 
the spirit of war sacrifice which they were called upon to demonstrate to 
their members vanished. Organized labour's failure to win fair wage 
clauses in war supply contracts of the Impérial Munitions Board lias been 
ail but ignored as a key factor leading to the buildup of industrial unrest 
but it was of singular importance in the development of trade union apathy 
towards the hoopla and bunting of the government's campaign of organized 
patriotism. 
War forced Canada into the large 
scale production of munitions. The 
new industry was born shortly after 
the outbreak of hostilities when 
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Minister of Militia, Sam Hughes, received an order from the British govern-
ment for two hundred thousand shrapnel shells. The only Canadian facility 
able to manufacture munitions of this kind, located in Québec City, was 
limited to a capacity of seventy-five rounds per day — clearly not enough 
for the job at hand.1 The solution to this problem was worked out in the 
nation-wide organization of a munitions industry operating out of railway 
shops, bridge works, foundries and machine shops from coast to coast. 
Initially the responsibility for directing this effort lay with the Shell Com-
mittee but a séries of scandais involving some of its principals prompted 
the establishment of the Impérial Munitions Board. Though the two 
committees were based in Canada, staffed and directed by Canadians and 
directly controlled war production in Canadian factories, they were admi-
nistrative agencies of the British Government and represented the Impérial 
minister of munitions. 2 
The development of a new and growing munitions industry in Canada 
was parallelled by the growth of a munitions work force and a new order 
of labour-management problems was bound to émerge. By 1914 fédéral 
and provincial governments were still in the early stages of establishing 
machinery for regulating industrial conditions and inevitably war produced 
new problems. A major difficulty arose, however, because the industrial 
destinies of tens of thousands of Canadian workers were being directed 
by the Shell Committee and its successor raising the question of where the 
power to deal with industrial problems in war industries now lay. Who 
was now responsible for the régulation of wages and working conditions 
in war plants, Ottawa, London or the Shell Committee and the I.M.B. ? 
The question might hâve remained a theoretical one but for the early 
émergence of the problem of fair wage clauses in munitions contracts. 
War workers and their leaders were not interested in solving difficulties 
in Impérial relations and grew impatient, angry and frustrated when their 
demands to hâve fair wage clauses inserted in munitions contracts were 
ignored or rejected. 
By August, 1914, it was standard procédure for the fédéral govern-
ment to include a fair wage schedule or a fair wage clause in every public 
works contact awarded. The practice was initiated in 1900 when Mac-
kenzie King prompted the Libéral government to provide légal protections 
i Industrial Canada, Toronto, July, 1915, p. 310. 
2 Public Archives of Canada (P.A.C.) Flavelle Papers, Vol. 6, File 96. Flavelle 
to Col. H. M. Elliot, December 8, 1915. 
604 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 28, NO 3 
on publicly financed projects by stipulating what wages must be paid to 
différent classes of workers or by forcing the contractor to pay wages 
comparable to those already prevailing in the district where the job was 
located.3 With the start of munitions production union leaders took it 
for granted that this practice would be extended to armaments work which 
they vehemently believed to be another type of government-financed public 
work. By December, 1914, shortly after the first shell contracts had been 
let, it became obvious that this was not the case prompting a représentative 
of the International Association of Machiniste to complain to fédéral labour 
minister T. W. Crothers that he saw no différence between shell production 
and traditional public works. 4 In this way organized labour launched a 
three-year campaign to hâve fair wage clauses inserted in war supply 
contracts and ran directly into the steadf ast opposition of the man who has 
been called » . . . the virtual czar of Canadian industrial mobilization... » 5, 
Joseph Wesley Fïavelle, Chairman of the Impérial Munitions Board. 
At first it did not appear that there should be any undue diffieulty 
in correcting the situation and providing for the insertion of fair wage 
clauses in shell contracts. Prime Minister Borden saw nothing unusual or 
extraordinary in labour's demands and suggested to the Chairman of 
the Shell Committee, Lt. Col. Alexander Bertram, that manufacturers be 
required to « . . . pay a fair wage » in ail contracts 6 even though he 
knew his government had no power to enforce the recommendation. The 
Président of the Trades and Labor Congress, James Watters, soon found 
this out when fédéral officiais told him they could not grant his request 
that fair wage clauses be made compulsory in munitions contracts since 
those contracts were let by an agency operating under the authority of the 
British government. 7 This need not hâve been any problem if Ottawa, 
London and the Shell Committee were willing to grant labour's requests, 
however, and by March, 1915, it appeared this was the case when Crothers 
and Bertram jointly announced that henceforth ail munitions contracts 
would contain a fair wage clause and further that manufacturers who 
3
 Ibid., « Mémorandum re Munitions Contracts, Fair Wages Clauses, etc. » 
June 11, 1917. 
4 Ibid., James Somerville to Crothers, December 19, 1914. 
5
 M. BLISS, « A Canadian Businessman and War : The Case of Joseph Fla-
velle, » in J. L. GRANATSTEIN and R. D. CUFF (eds.), War and Society in 
North America, Toronto, 1971, p. 20. 
6 Ibid., Borden to Bertram, January 26, 1915. 
7 The Voice, Winnipeg, February 5, 1915, p. 4. 
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failed to abide by the contracts would not receive future work from the 
Committee.8 Bertram, along with Canadian and British authorities, had 
apparently concluded that fair wage clauses were not a very radical 
departure from government policy and were a cheap price to pay for trade 
union goodwill. 
From April to November, 1915, the Borden administration and the 
British government embarked upon the investigation and reorganization 
of the Shell Committee and its methods. The scandai had initially leaked 
out in April and until confidence could be restored in the leadership and 
direction of Canadian war production, it was not possible for continuing 
policies, such as the implementation of fair wage clauses, to be embarked 
upon. Nevertheless organized labour carried its case directly to London 9 
and learned that the British had already considered the requests and 
favoured them.10 Whitehall considered the T.L.C.'s position reasonable 
and was ready to propose to the Canadian government that ail munitions 
contracts placed « . . . through the Dominion Government itself or 
through... the Canadian Pacific Railway Company should contain the 
Canadien Fair Wages Clause. » n 
Neither British nor Canadian authorities objected to the insertion of 
fair wage clauses but Joseph Flavelle expressed his opposition soon after 
assuming his new position. The introduction of fair wage clauses would 
upset the délicate balance of industrial peace that already existed in 
Canadian war plants, he commented, because the inclusion of such stipu-
lations in future contracts would create conflicts in those factories already 
at work where no such clauses existed to govern wages. Flavelle's opinion 
that nothing in the current situation suggested any action should be taken 
which justified throwing Canadian war industry into chaos,12 carried the 
day when he received extraordinary support from an unexpected source. 
In a despatch to British Colonial Secretary Bonar Law, the Govemor 
General of Canada weighed thèse opinions against Borden's and wrote 
that in the best interests of the Impérial Government and the Canadian 
8 ibid., March 12, 1915, p. 4. 
9 Proceedings of the Thirty-First Annual Convention of the Trades and Labor 
Congress of Canada : (1915), p. 20. Henceforth cited as TDC Proceedings. 
10 The Voice, August 20, 1915, p. 4. 
n P.A.C. Borden Papers RLB 1419. B.B. Cubitt to A. Bonar Law, August 23, 
1915. 
12 Ibid., Govemor General to A. Bonar Law, December 17, 1915. 
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people it was « . . . not necessary that the Fair Wages Clause should be 
inserted. » 13 The British and Canadian governments had both given their 
approval, it was only Havelle who said no. 
This procédure was not a deliberate attempt by Ottawa and London 
to duck their responsibility — it was proper and legally correct. The 
Shell Committee and the Impérial Munitions Board were agencies of the 
British Minister of Munitions and did not fali under the jurisdiction of 
the Canadian government. The British Government thus had the power 
to order first Bertram, then Flavelle, to insert the fair wage clauses into 
munitions contracts but were obviously unwilling to overrule the man on 
the spot. Trade union friendship was desired but not worth the price of 
undermining the décisions of a man like Joseph Ravelle. This situation 
could not be appreciated by représentatives of Canadian munitions workers 
who tended to blâme the lack of movement on bureaucratie sidestepping. 
Each month's delay clouded the atmosphère further, embittered the unions 
and turned their thoughts ever closer to direct strike action to back their 
demands. 
In January, 1916, a mixed délégation of union officiais representing 
Canadian war workers met Prime Minister Borden and put their case 
briefly and bluntly. They blamed his government for not regulating wage 
and working conditions in war industry plants, pointed out that society 
was now putting a premium on patriotism and complained that workers 
could not easily resort to strikes without being accused of sabotaging the 
national war effort. They were, they asserted, in an unfair and intolérable 
position 14 and warned that strikes had only been prevented thus far by 
the spécial efforts of union officers. In future, however, quick and décisive 
government action was going to be the only way to maintain industrial 
peace.15 
Unknown to the unions the ponderous wheels of government were 
beginning to grind, albeit slowly. In late January the Colonial Office 
informed Borden of London's growing concern over the lack of any 
solution to the matter. Officiais there feared « . . . serious... labour trou-
bles . . . » might resuit unless some effective action was taken on the 
13 lbid. 
14 TLC Proceedings, 1916, p. 19. 
15 lbid., p. 17-18. 
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demands of the Canadian unions David Lloyd George, then minister of 
munitions, suggested that the Canadian govemment might wish to follow 
Great Britain's example by establishing a spécial tribunal to arbitrale 
wage disputes. Contract priées, he observed, were certainly high enough to 
allow Canadian shell manufacturers to pay fair wages.16 
In the face of Flavelle's steadfast opposition, reiterated in March, 
1916, in a meeting with Borden and the minister of labour,17 the Govern-
ment decided to embark on an entirely différent course. The cabinet now 
aimed to use existing stipulations and machinery of the Industrial Disputes 
Investigation Act by issuing an order-in-council extending its provisions 
to cover war industries.18 This was acceptable to Flavelle because the Act 
was broad in scope, its facilities already existed and it could be introduced 
without any possible interférence in the continuing process of munitions 
production.19 On March 23, 1916, the Government issued order-in-
council P.C. 680 which extended the I.D.I.A. to ail war production in 
Canada. 2° 
This came after months of considération and discussion. Borden had 
expressed his belief many times that there would be nothing unusual in 
adopting fair wage clauses for munitions contracts but upon consulting 
with Crothers and Flavelle was won over to the position that such action 
might be too drastic. The Prime Minister then concluded that the wisest 
course open was to extend and use législation already on the books. This 
was in line with Flavelle's belief that it might be dangerous and disruptive 
to war production to impose fair wage clauses on the munitions industry. 21 
Again Flavelle's views prevailed because the govemment's action of 
March 23 was clearly designed to shelve the entire fair wages issue. 
Once Ottawa decided to try this approach, London gave its full 
support to the policy and dropped its insistence upon the adoption of fair 
wages clauses. The Colonial Secretary told Borden that Whitehall now 
believed the use of the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act, coupled 
16
 Flavelle Papers Vol. 6, File 96. A. Bonar Law to Governor-General, January 
21, 1916. 
17 ibid., Vol. 5, File 11. Mémo of March 3, 1916. 
18 Ibid. 
19 ibid. 
20 Canada, Labour Gazette, April, 1916, p. 1059. 
21 Flavelle Papers Vol. 6, File 96. Borden to Lloyd George, June 5, 1917. 
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with active policing by the Canadian Department of labour, would be 
sufficient to secure the payment of proper wages in Canadian war plants. 22 
The Canadian labour minister, T. W. Crothers, also thought this approach 
would settle the issue and agreed with Flavelle's argument that it was 
dangerous to tamper with a smoothly running opération. At the very 
least, Crothers believed, the new machinery should be given a try and his 
Department would do ail it could to bring about success. 23 Thus, by the 
late summer of 1916 both governments had gone as far as they were 
willing to go without being pushed and in the face of Flavelle's steadfast 
opposition, backed away from their original positions. 
Organized labour, however, was not at ail willing to leave the issue 
in limbo and late in the spring of 1917 the Trades Congress and the 
International Association of Machinists made yet another effort to secure 
fair wage clauses for Canadian war workers. This time they fully realized 
who their real enemy was. Since approaches to the Canadian government 
appeared to be futile, the Machinists and the Trades Congress put their 
case into the hands of the British Labour Patry and emphasized Flavelle's 
leading rôle in frustrating their demands. They charged he had opposed 
the insertion of fair wage clauses in munitions contracts and added that 
he had refused to assume any responsibility whatever for the working 
conditions of Canadians engaged in war production. To compound the 
situation, they pointed out, Borden's government had no authority to force 
the I.M.B. into any course of action since it was a British Government 
agency. There was thus no authority to which Canadian labour could 
appeal to redress their grievances. ^ 
The new campaign did begin to force the Canadian government into 
a reconsideration of the position it had adopted the previous year. Borden, 
for example, corne to the conclusion that the I.D.I.A. extension, supported 
by increased co-operation between his labour department and the I.M.B., 
was not working. He told Lloyd George, now Prime Minister of Great 
Britain, that it was not always possible to redress labour's grievances to 
the satisfaction of the union leaders and that Canadian workers were 
becoming « . . . very restless and irritated. » In his opinion everything of 
a reasonable character should be done to accommodate their wishes. 25 
22 lbid., A Bonar Law to Governor-General, June 30, 1916. 
23 lbid., Crothers to Borden, July 17, 1916. 
24 Borden Papers RLB 1419. Moore & McClelland to Thomas, May 17, 1917. 
25 Flavelle Papers Vol. 6, File 96. Borden to Lloyd George, June 5, 1917. 
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Since he had previously expressed the view that fair wage clauses were 
not unreasonable it is safe to assume that he was now finally ready to 
give this course a try. 
Borden's assessment of organized labour's mood was ail too accu-
rate — they were now fighting mad. In June, 1917, a meeting of twenty 
six représentatives of varions war industry unions including machinists, 
blacksmiths, electricians, métal workers and others, together with leading 
Trades Congress officiais issued a sweeping condemnation of Joseph Fla-
velle and the Impérial Munitions Board. The gathering was organized to 
express the grievances and complaints of workers about their alleged 
suffering under the I .M.B. yoke. Abuses charged dkectly to the I .M.B., 
or plants under its direction, included élimination of the eight hour day 
and introduction of longer hours ; violation of sanitary standards in camp 
and plant construction ; lowering of wage standards throughout the 
country and refusai to recognize trade union représentatives in the déter-
mination of wages and hours. The delegates claimed that nothing short 
of a complète reorganization of the Board would be satisfactory and that 
massive strike action in war plants would soon be initiated as a last 
resor t . 2 6 
This pointed censure of the I.M.B., combined with the threat of 
serious disruption in Canadian war industry, stimulated a great deal of 
discussion at the fédéral government level. Flavelle, for instance, now 
added a new argument to those he had been advancing ail along. H e told 
Borden that Canada could not follow the British example and introduce 
fair wage clauses into munitions contracts because n o machinery existed 
for their enforcement. In Britain, he pointed out, fair wage boards had 
been established with wide powers over wages and production and since 
no such facilities existed in Canada the introduction of fair wage clauses 
would only lead to confusion. In addition, he asserted, no other country 
with as great an industrial output as Canada had experienced so little 
labour trouble. 27 
This time Flavelle failed to receive the support of his usual ally, 
T. W. Crothers. The minister of labour not only parted company with 
the I .M.B. chairman, he pointedly criticised the entire gist of his argument. 
26
 Ibid., « Mémorandum re Munitions Contracts, Fair Wages Clauses, etc. », 
June 11, 1917. 
27 ibid., Flavelle to Borden, June 7, 1917. 
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He did not agrée that there was no machinery for the enforcemnet of 
fair wage clauses in Canada and pointed out that his départaient had 
already combined with the Board to deal with many complaints of unfair 
labour practices on an ad hoc basis. More to the point, he did not now 
see any good reason for failing to implement the fair wage clause policy 
since, in reality, nothing would actually change but the unions would at 
least get what they were after. 28 
This last argument went to the very heart of the issue. Crothers had 
finally become convinced that war production would not be affected in 
any way by the introduction of fair wage clauses in munitions contracts 
since his Department would continue to investigate complaints and turn 
those found to be justified over to the I.M.B. for action. This meant, in 
effect, that the unions would in substance gain nothing more than they 
already had so why not keep them happy and give them the formai légal 
guarantees they so obviously desired ? 29 This belief was supportée! by a 
man who worked closely with Flavelle and had great respect for his 
employer — the Director of Labour for the Impérial Munitions Board, 
Mark Howard Irish. 
Irish was convinced that organized labour was using the fair wage 
issue to whip up discontent amongst rank and file union members in 
order to strengthen their hand in a drive for power and prestige. The 
insertion of fair wage clauses in munitions contracts would slow down 
their campaign, defuse a potentially explosive issue and in reality give 
nothing in return. In a note to his superior Irish claimed that the fair 
wage clause in City of Toronto public works contracts was not worth 
« . . . the cost of the ink that prints it » but gave labour leaders something 
to crow about to their members. This in itself might be objectionable but 
at least it would calm the atmospere and keep union leaders happy : 
Just so long as the Labour Leader has nothing to point his 
followers to as being accomplished for them, just so long will 
he keep agitating for a demonstrable accomplishment. Give 
him a chance to turn to his electors and point to the Fair Wage 
Clause concession having being 'wrenched' from the Munitions 
Board, and he is re-established and can take a holiday from 
agitation.30 
28 Borden Papers RLB 1419. Crothers to Borden, June 9, 1917. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Flavelle Papers Vol. 6, File 96. Irish to Flavelle, June 15, 1917. 
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Irish was very nearly correct. By mid-1917 ail traces of prewar 
recession and unemployment had vanished as a resuit of recruitment 
and the mobilization of war production. This created a manpower 
shortage in most war industries and the natural resuit was rising wages. 
Wage classifications for certain types of workers, particularly those most 
skilled and most capable of performing the intricate opérations of shell 
manufacturing, were high and were increasing.31 It is certainly true that 
many unskilled and semi-skilled workers did not benefit from this process 
to the degree that groups such as the machinists did, but it was the latter 
trade that yelled the loudest about unfair wages and poor working condi-
tions. Though union leaders were concerned with mamtaining équitable 
wage standards, they were equally desirous of showing followers and 
prospective members that they were capable of making significant monetary 
and légal gains. The war was the best opportunity yet to corne along to 
enhance prestige and build massive unions and the fair wage fight became 
a key battle in the broader campaign. Had fair wage clauses been placed 
in munitions contracts from the very beginning, in 1914, they would never 
hâve become an issue but Flavelle's opposition made them one. 
In August, 1917, the British Government handed down its final 
pronouncement on the matter when they told Borden they had changed 
their minds once again and arrived at the conclusion that fair wage clauses 
were now necessary. The British Minister of Munitions, Winston Churchill, 
noted that increased agitation on the part of Canadian unions had prompted 
him to end his opposition to fair wage clauses and to propose their 
inclusion in ail future contracts placed by the I.M.B. in Canada.32 Lloyd 
George was in complète sympathy with this position and told Borden that 
although his government had waited to see if the I.D.I.A. extension would 
work, it now believed the action was futile and the desired end of industrial 
peace could only be assured through the introduction of fair wage clauses.33 
The line-up against Flavelle was now formidable and included Borden, 
Lloyd George, Winston Churchill, T. W. Crothers and Mark Howard 
31
 See Canada, Wages and Hours of Labour in Canada, 1901-1920. Various 
tables clearly show dramatic wage increases. For example, ail classes of métal 
workers enjoyed weekly increases of 46.3% and hourly increases of 54.7% from 
1914 to 1918 according to index tables on p. 3. 
32 Borden Papers RLB 1419. M. Wolff to Undersecretary of State, Colonial 
Office, August 6, 1917. 
33 ibid., Lloyd George to Borden, August 8, 1917. 
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Irish, not to mention the Trades Congress and the International Asso-
ciation of Maehinists. Flavelle was the key man, however, and had shown 
himself virtually indispensible to the efficient direction and management 
of Canadian war industry. Any attempt by the British or Canadian Go-
vernments to override his opposition might resuit at best in érosion of 
his authority or at worst his résignation. This was not a price they were 
willing to pay and once again, for the last time, Flavelle won and the 
unions lost. 
As the powerful head of Canada's vast and productive munitions 
industry Flavelle shouldered a great deal of responsibility and maintained 
a necessary singleness of purpose — the unhindered and continuing pro-
duction of as much war material as could be squeezed out of Canadian 
industry. He was well aware of the importance of labour in his efforts. 
A Board représentative estimated at one point that as much as 60% of 
the total cost of munitions production in Canada was expended directly or 
indirectly no wage.34 But Flavelle's methods for handling labour's grie-
vances were not designed to win friends in Canadian union halls prima-
rily because his aims and those of organized labour were widely divergent. 
Where the unions, eventually supported by Crothers, desired to make 
substantial organizational and prestige gains as their just reward for 
faithful war production service (a victory that was apparently being won 
in the United States) Flavelle was solely interested in maximizing pro-
duction. In addition he was personally inclined to guard against the 
growth or expansion of trade union influence because he was philosophi-
cally opposed to unions and what they were trying to accomplish. 
Flavelle's primary method for handling labour disputes was based 
on co-operation with the Department of Labour and subtle persuasion of 
those manufacturers who tented to be intransigent towards their employées. 
The Board was an arm of the Impérial Government and therefore, in 
Flavelle's opinion, should not attempt to interfère « . . . on its own initia-
tive . . . » in labour troubles by supporting either workers or employers.35 
When obvious crisis situations arose and it appeared that Board inter-
vention was a must, Flavelle opted to attempt to persuade industrialists 
that labour unrest in their plants could be contagious and might eventually 
34 Flavelle Papers Vol. 5, File 11. W. Peterson to E. Fitzgerald. 
35 ibid., Mémo of Mard i 3, 1916. 
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damage the entire national war effort.36 In extrême cases, however, 
Flavelie was willing to go as far as cancelling a contract if circumstances 
warranted it or if the Labour Department recommended such action. In 
February, 1916, for instance a Medicine Hat steel company received notice 
that its agreement with the Board was being cancelled due to a failure 
to solve labour problems in its shops.37 
The possible disruption of war production was not, however, the 
only reason for Flavelle's continuing unwavering opposition to labour's de-
mands. He was opposed to the principles of trades unionism and the 
rationale which underlay the campaign for fair wage clauses. Flavelie 
believed in the rock-solid principles of individualism, hard work and 
compétition. He inherently mistrusted or opposed combinations or co-
opérative groups which banded together for the mutual advantage of their 
members whether thèse be organizations of companies in trusts or cartels 
or of hog farmers.38 This sort of approach also lead him to a natural anti-
pathy towards trade unionism and undoubtedly prompted his almost ins-
tinctive reaction to shy away from any appearance of co-operation with 
organized labour. While Irish's argument was pointed, accurate and pro-
bably revealed a great deal of labour's true motives in the campaign for 
fair wage clauses, the very idea that union leaders would gain prestige 
from having appeared to wrench concessions from the I.M.B. would un-
doubtedly harden Flavelle's opposition even more. Then too, Flavelie 
was adamantly opposed to having governments do for people by législation 
and régulation what they ought to accomplish on their own by sacrifice, 
clear thinking and hard work.39 Flavelie, therefore, was not about to 
allow his Board to become the vehicle by which trade unions were going 
to advance on any front as a resuit of war-presented opportunities. The 
status quo ante bellum was fine and even that might hâve allowed or-
ganized labour too powerful a position. 
By the fall of 1917 the battle was over and Flavelle's will had 
prevailed. Union leaders were angered over the lack of action which 
met their efforts to obtain fair wage clauses and realized they had slipped 
36 Ibid., Flavelie to « Ail Manufacturer in Hamilton and Toronto », June 1, 
1916. 
37 ibid., Mémo of March 3, 1916. 
38 BLISS, pp. 26-27. 
39 ibid., p. 31. 
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into a légal morass where no one was willing to help eut the Gordian 
Knot. They had been unable to obtain any results from a campaign of 
peaceful lobbying and turned increasingly to strike action. The dismal 
failure of the campaign to obtain fair wage clauses in munitions contracts 
showed the almost total ineffectiveness of organized labour when it was 
not dealing from a position of strength and was trying to force concessions 
from men or institutions determined to stand firm. The contrast to the 
very successful drive of Canadian railway shop craft workers to obtain 
wage parity with their United States counterparts was striking. In this 
campaign union leaders were backed by the strikes votes of 50,000 
railway workers and it was the naked threat of a complète national rail 
tie-up in wartime which forced the Canadian Railway War Board and 
the Borden government to agrée to substantial wage increases in the sum-
mer of 1918. The contrast between pétition and strike must hâve become 
starkly apparent. 
Government-union relations, already strained by registration and 
conscription, suffered another blow. Union leaders were not party to the 
secret despatches and memoranda of Borden, Lloyd George, Crothers 
or Irish. They knew only that the Impérial Munitions Board, headed by 
an industrialist, arm of one government and in the close confidence of 
another, was frustrating their desires and there appeared to be no redress 
from either London or Ottawa. Some of the bitterness that developed 
during this long and frustrating campaign returned to haunt the Borden 
government in the spreading strikes of 1918 and the massive confrontations 
of 1919. 
Le mouvement syndical et VImpérial Munitions Board 
Les études sur le radicalisme syndical et sur l'agitation ouvrière au Canada 
pendant la période 1917-1919 se sont concentrées sur des questions comme la 
conscription, la hausse du coût de la vie et les décrets ministériels restrictifs. On 
n'a accordé que peu d'atention au facteur moins généralisé, mais tout aussi impor-
tant, de l'agressivité des syndicats, dont le nombre des adhérents avait augmenté 
de plusieurs milliers de membres par suite de la rareté de main-d'oeuvre provoquée 
par la guerre, en vue d'accroître de façon réelle et bien visible leur prestige et leur 
influence. À l'époque où il n'existait ni précompte obligatoire, ni Commission des 
relations du travail, ni accréditation, les syndicats se devaient de montrer au membre 
éventuel qu'ils étaient assez puissants pour leur permettre d'atteindre un stade de 
sécurité financière et de sécurité d'emploi qu'il ne pouvait pas obtenir par ses 
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propres moyens. Une façon d'y arriver, c'était de démontrer que les syndicats 
étaient assez forts pour en imposer aux employeurs et au gouvernement. La bataille 
menée en vue d'obtenir l'inclusion des dispositions concernant les justes salaires 
dans les contrats de fourniture militaire adjugés par le Shell Committee et son 
successeur, VImperial Munitions Board était essentiellement un combat en vue 
de réaliser les fins précitées. 
La déclaration de la guerre et l'implantation au Canada de nombreux arse-
naux incita les syndicats à se plaindre que les stipulations relatives aux justes 
salaires n'étaient pas insérées dans le contrats de munitions, même si cela avait été 
la politique constante du gouvernement fédéral d'insérer de pareilles dispositions 
dans les contrats publics depuis 1900. La campagne des syndicats avait l'appui de 
plusieurs officiers haut gradés du gouvernement britannique qui avaient institué 
le Shell Committee, et du premier ministre Borden. Le Shell Committee lui-même, 
sous la direction du lieutenant-colonel Alexander Bertram, reconnut le bien-fondé 
des réclamations syndicales et promit de redresser la situation. Il ne put mettre sa 
promesse à exécution, cependant, parce que à la suite d'un scandale, le Comité fut 
aboli et remplacé par VImperial Munitions Board dont la direction fut confiée au 
magnat torontois des abattoirs, Joseph Westley Flavelle. Flavelle était un véritable 
tenant des principes de l'individualisme et de la « libre entreprise » et il était en 
conséquence un ardent adversaire de toute forme de collaboration, en particulier 
la coopération entre l'industrie et le syndicalisme. Il ne pouvait pas accepter que le 
gouvernement fasse à la place des individus et des sociétés ce que ceux-ci pouvaient 
faire par eux-mêmes. 
Flavelle était un homme indispensable à l'effort de guerre britannique et 
canadien. C'était l'organisateur et le coordonnateur par excellence et, pour cette 
raison, son influence était déterminante dans l'établissement de la politique ouvrière 
du gouvernement en temps de guerre. Même si les gouvernements britannique et ca-
nadien étaient favorables à l'idée d'insérer des clauses de justes salaires dans les 
contrats de fournitures militaires, Flavelle se rebiffa et demeura inébranlable dans 
son opposition pendant deux longues années de pression de la part des syndicats. 
Son entêtement fit de l'affaire une source de mécontentement et d'agitation qui 
n'aurait pas existes si l'on avait suivi la politique première de Bertram et du 
Shell Committee. 
En gains matériels véritables, le mouvement ouvrier n'avait rien à retirer de 
clauses de justes salaires. Les travailleurs canadiens alors employés dans les arsenaux 
touchèrent des salaires élevés pendant toute la durée de la guerre, tandis qu'un 
soi-disant mécanisme existait déjà pour s'occuper des pratiques déloyales de travail 
dans les arsenaux. Ce fait fut finalement admis par le ministre fédéral du travail, 
T.W. Crothers et, chose surprenante, par Mark Howard Irish, propre directeur de 
Flavelle en matière de relations du travail pour VImperial Munitions Board. Au 
milieu de l'année 1917, ces deux hommes en arrivèrent à la conclusion que l'inclusion 
de clauses concernant les justes salaires dans les contrats de fournitures militaires 
ne donnerait rien d'autre aux travailleurs que ce dont ils bénéficiaient déjà mais 
créerait une situation explosive en permettant aux dirigeants syndicaux d'obtenir 
le crédit d'une longue bataille enfin gagnée. Flavelle, toutefois, persista dans son 
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opposition au mouvement précisément parce qu'il ne voulait pas que les dirigeants 
syndicaux en tirent crédit. 
Ainsi, ce qui n'aurait pu être qu'une difficulté administrative de peu d'im-
portance se gonfla au point de devenir une source de conflit ouvrier et devint un 
excitant puissant à l'appui de l'opposition de plus en plus farouche du mouvement 
ouvrier aux politiques de Vlmperial Munitions Board. Cette campagne de lobbying 
infructueuse apparut encore plus amère quand on la mit en présence de la campagne 
victorieuse des travailleurs des usines des chemins de fer canadiens qui obtinrent 
la parité de salaire avec leurs camarades américains au cours de l'été de 1918. 
Cette campagne ne fut d'ailleurs réussie que parce que les chefs des syndicats 
entrèrent dans la bagarre armée de 50,000 votes en faveur de la grève. 
Dans de telles circonstances, l'affaire des clauses de justes salaires s'ajouta 
au voile de difficultés et de méfiance engendrées par d'autres décisions et d'autres 
actes politiques du gouvernement Borden et de ses agences qui commença à 
obscurcir les relations entre le gouvernement et les syndicats dès le début de 1916. 
La plupart de ces questions devinrent les facteurs primordiaux qui donnèrent nais-
sance au grand mouvement d'agitation ouvrière qui, commençant à s'accélérer 
à la fin de 1916, s'étendit par la suite à la scène nationale au cours de l'été de 1919. 
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